

American Association of University Professors - 10 June 1978

Second Speaker - Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director of Central Intelligence

Good morning, good afternoon. In thinking about being with you here today, I was struck by the commonality of our profession. The intelligence profession, the academic profession are both founded on good research and searching out information. They're both founded on analyzing that information, interpreting it, adding to the fund of knowledge available. They're both founded on publishing that data, making it available to those who need it so they can draw better conclusions in whatever line of work they are engaged. In our country there is a similarity because in the non-governmental sector there's a greater concentration of research skills as identified by a PhD in the academic community than anywhere else; in the governmental sector that concentration is in the intelligence community. We have more PhD's than anyone else in the government. This commonality means in my view that we have a good enough foundation for a more comfortable, a more mutually supportive relationship than has existed in recent years. I happen to believe that a more mutually supportive relationship between us is particularly important to the United States of America today. Why? Because good intelligence is more important today than at any time since World War II. Your contribution to it can be significant and entirely proper.

Why is it more important that we have good intelligence? Thirty years ago we had absolute military superiority. Today we are in the position of mere parity. Clearly, the leverage of knowing other people's capability and intentions in the military sphere is much greater when you are at a position of mere parity. Thirty years ago we were totally

independent economically. Today we are clearly interdependent with many other countries. It is much more important today that we know what is going on and what is going to happen in the economic sphere than it was thirty years ago. Thirty years ago we were a dominant political power and many smaller nations took their cue from us automatically. Today not only do those nations not take cues from anybody, but there are many many more of them. Pick up your morning papers and read about a country you never heard of a decade ago. It's everyday in that way. Why, though, must we obtain information about the military, political and economic activities through intelligence? For the simple reasons that we are blessed by living in the most open society the world has ever known. But most of the nations of the world do not enjoy that privilege. And yet the activities of those closed societies have tremendous import and impact on our military, political and economic well being.

For instance, would anyone in this room even think of concluding an agreement on strategic arms limitation with the Soviet Union if we could not assure you from the intelligence side that we could check and verify whether that agreement is being carried out. This isn't a question of whether you trust the Soviets; whether you have confidence that they will do what they say. The stakes are too high in this particular game for any country to put its total fate in the hands of someone else without any ability to check on them.

So, too, with the many other negotiations in which our government is engaged today in an attempt to reduce the threshold of the

probability of resort to arms. Mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe; antisatellite negotiations; comprehensive test bans on nuclear weapons testing; reductions in conventional arms sales around the world - all of these are founded on good intelligence.

But much more than the military sphere is at stake. Our country stands for increased international economic growth, narrowing the gap between the under-privileged nations of the southern hemisphere and those of us to the North. And yet, here too, you need good economic information. You need not be surprised by a closed society like the Soviet Union that entered the grain market in 1973 in a way that disturbs all of our economies and yours and my pocketbook.

The CIA today publishes unclassified estimates. One last summer on the future of the Soviet economy, trying to inform everyone what to expect from that closed society, saying that they are going to have some problems in the decade ahead. Problems which will lead to pressure that will keep them from entering the international market as much as they are today we believe, and therefore impact on American business. We've had a study that was published on the international energy situation - that said that over the next decade the demand for oil out of the ground will be greater than the amount we can physically get out; not that it's not down there, but than we can get out. Therefore, there are bound to be increased pressures on prices and there will be restriction on economic growth. If we are going to combat, as we would like to in this country, a war on international terrorism, you simply have to penetrate and find out what is going on in international terrorist organizations. We do that from an intelligence base. If we are going

to conduct the war on international drug trafficking, you have to do much the same kinds of things.

And in the international political sphere, if you're an interventionist, an activist, you want the United States to get involved, or if you're a pacifist and you don't want the United States to get involved, you simply have to have good information as a foundation for your policy in one direction or the other.

Hence, this country must have today, some organization, call it the CIA or whatever you will, that can operate overseas, openly and clandestinely in order to gain the information that our policymakers need.

Today, however, the rules and the players have changed. Your intelligence community is under the tightest control and is operating more openly than ever before. We are, in my opinion, in an exciting period, an exciting experiment, in which we are evolving a new, uniquely American model of intelligence. What are these controls? What are these checks and balances that Bill referred to that we now have and did not have when the Church Committee report was written?

One, you have myself, the Director of Central Intelligence, with strengthened authority today. New authority to bring together all of the intelligence activities of our country, not just those of the CIA. And my personal conviction that the Intelligence Community will and must operate in conformance with the laws of this country and with its moral standards; and that it must cooperate fully with the oversight bodies that have been established.

What are those oversight bodies? What are those checks and balances

built into the governmental structure? First is the President and the Vice President who today take a very active and strong interest in our intelligence activities and supervise them closely.

Secondly, there is something known as the Intelligence Oversight Board; three distinguished citizens appointed by the President reporting only to him and to whom you or any of our employees can communicate directly. Call them up, write them and say you think Admiral Turner's off on a bad tack. They will investigate it; report only to the President.

Beyond that there is a new role in the Justice Department; new regulations which they write and tell me how I may go about conducting my business.

And finally, there are two very rigorous oversight committees of the Congress; one in each chamber. And I can tell you having been on the hill for over twelve hours this last week that they hold me to the task. They interrogate me, we provide them detailed information and they know what is going on. In addition to this, I rely very much on the American public as a form of control on our intelligence activities. So today we are responding more to the media; we are coming more to academic conferences and symposiums, writing papers and supporting your activities. We are lecturing more; we are participating more in panels like this - and we are publishing more; we're publishing all that we can legally declassify and still find that we have a value to the American public. And any university or college that is not subscribing to the Library of Congress for \$255 a year to all the publications that we put out from the CIA, and average of two a week on an unclassified

basis, is missing one of the greatest source bargains in the world. We have the Freedom of Information Act and a greater declassification program. These are not just a public relations gimmick, these are founded in a sincere conviction that the better informed the American public is on issues of national interest, the stronger our democracy will be.

We want particularly, however, to share with the academic community. On the one hand because we need you. We need, as any research organization does, outside scrutiny to ask, are we seeing the woods for the trees? Are we making those same old assumptions year after year? Are we mired in our own thinking? Is our analysis rigorous? On the other hand, I think there is an untapped potential for the academic community from the world of intelligence. Our new sophisticated technical means of collecting intelligence has all kinds of potential for you as well as for us. I just learned the other day, for instance, that there's tremendous potential for archeology in our aerial photography capability; an ability to get to archeological ruins that are politically or geographically inaccessible and even to find more when you're there than you can get on the ground. We're anxious to share if we can in spheres like this. At the same time we're anxious to have you share with us your expertise, your knowledge, because we have a basic principle. We do not want to risk and spend money to go out overseas and clandestinely collect information when it is openly available inside our own society. So whatever connections with you, and not only with you but the entire American public, is an informal connection to try to ask questions and find out what people have learned if they have traveled abroad as they have studied or they've done research. And this includes informal consulting in areas of academic and scientific, technical expertise.

Beyond them we do have formal, contractual paid relationships with consultants, or for providing information. These are normally open unless the recipient, the person with whom we contract wants them to be kept confidential. We want the universities, in the cases of academics, to be informed. But clearly the relationship between the individual professor and the university is the relationship between them and not between us and the universities.

We agree that if a university like Bill's requires that all outside commitments of academic members be reported to the administration the CIA should be no exception. We disagree, however; that the CIA relationship should be singled out uniquely as it is in the Harvard guidelines which assumes that only a relationship with the CIA would endanger the professor's or the school's integrity. With all the opportunities today for conflict of interest we think that is a naive assumption.

Beyond the exchange of information in both directions, it should be obvious that we in the intelligence community are just as dependent as the American business community and the American academic community itself on recruiting good U.S. students, graduates of our universities and our colleges. We can't exist over time without an annual input of a relatively few of the high quality of American university graduates. We recruit today openly on about 150 different campuses just like businesses or other government agencies. I am sorry to have to tell you that there are a few campuses on which we are denied the right to have free communications and free associations.

In addition, the CIA needs to contract with some foreign students in our country, some very few of the 120,000 of these students. And despite malicious stories otherwise, let me assure you that all such

contracts are without coercion, are entirely free, and entirely a matter of choice with individual foreign students.

Let me sum up by saying that in intelligence in our country today we operate under two imperatives. The first is to recognize that the juxtaposition of open and closed societies in our world has dangers for the open society. Now there is not one of us here who would trade the short term advantages that accrue to a closed society for the blessings of openness and respect for the individual human being that we have in our society and we all have faith that that is a long term strength of great advantage. But at the same time we cannot be so naive as to think that we can forego collecting information about these closed societies without giving them undue and unnecessary advantage.

Our second imperative is to recognize that the basic purpose of intelligence in our country is to support and defend its free institutions. We attempt to do that by providing the most comprehensive, the most reliable data we can to the President, to the Congress, to some extent to the American public so that the best decisions for all of us can be made. In my view, it would make no sense whatsoever for us to jeopardize any of those free institutions in the process of collecting that information. I assure you that we are dedicated to conducting intelligence in the United States in ways that will only strengthen the basic institutions, the basic standards of our country. Thank you.

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In response to Bill Ward's very thoughtful comments on the threat of the CIA to our society: He said first it was a threat because there were not adequate organizational checks and balances. I hope I answered that in my comments. Let me point out that the Church Committee report is outdated by a great deal of the actions that we have taken to carry out these recommendations. Secondly, he was concerned that there can't be constituent power brought to bear as a check on the CIA because we can't tell the public everything about what we do. I agree with him that that is in fact the case. But at the same time, I am listening for a prescription of how to cure that. Our prescription is what I call surrogate public constituent oversight. That surrogate process are these committees of the Congress and the Intelligence Oversight Board that I referred to. As Bill has said, he supports the need for good intelligence in our country. But there is a conflict between having good intelligence and having 100% openness. And it is not the Intelligence Community alone that has secrets in our country. It is the academic community. CAP researchers certainly don't share their research before they publish it. It is the business community, who don't share information on their accounts and their plans and their programs. It is academics who consult with the business community and don't reveal the strategy for the firms that they are advising. All

of us have this problem of where we draw the line between complete public inspection of our activities and some degree of secrecy. We have been drawing it further and further in this country and, under this new model of intelligence, forced public disclosure. We are trying our best, but there are great risks and there have been disclosures that have not been intended that have seriously jeopardized our ability to continue an intelligence function and institution.

Morton asked some questions here that are complex. I'm not sure I've got them all written down or I can decide how to answer them. I think he makes an inference that I want to establish principles. The CIA does not operate collecting intelligence in the United States of America. Our job is to collect foreign intelligence overseas. We don't clandestinely work against the American citizen, or against the foreign citizen in this country. We come to them openly to ask them for information. We're not allowed by law to so call "spy" on the American citizen, or on the foreign citizen in this country. He pointed out that he thinks it's wrong that there be recruiting in which the individual is not informed that he is being considered for a position in the CIA. Everyone of you, every year I suspect, get a number of letters asking who's a good graduate student to go work here, or who would be good professors for the head of a department in another university, or that IBM would like to employ this person or that--could you recommend somebody. And I am sure that if you sum up their

qualities, their strengths, you rush right out and give that to the individual who is concerned. We recruit on campuses, we recruit just like everybody else does. Some of it's open, some of it's not. The not portions--Morton didn't hear me talk about them in my speech; and which he complained vigorously that I did not address or the CIA will not address. For the first time in public I addressed this issue today of recruiting foreign students on campuses and I told you we do very few out of some 120,000 who are here. And there is utterly no coercion in it. And it's no more secretive than much of the other recruiting that is done.

Questions and Answers - 10 June 1978

Q: If we agree that the best intelligence, the best analysis, is necessary for comment on foreign affairs or the whole variety of things which you named; Would it not be possible to split the operational side of the agency completely from the policy and analysis side so that the policy and analysis side would not only be publicly available but I think would even serve the interest of the agency. Secondly, I think that they would have the confidence that they would have a policy analysis for getting a particular spy to contract who is exposed to the scrutiny of other professionals in the field. I think that split between the operational and the policy and analysis side would not only allow academics to participate comfortably, it would also serve the interest of the agency.

A: I think what you're really saying, Bill, is that academics simply have a built in bias--that if they associate with the CIA they're tarnished. Even Norman Bimbaum is associating with us these days. Seriously, the connection between the analysts and the people who collect intelligence--whether they collect it from our technical system, whether they collect it from our human intelligence system, whether they collect it from our overt, open system--is absolutely fundamental to the process of intelligence. It would be like somebody doing research on geological strata out in the field and digging cores and not being willing to talk to the people back in the university who are analyzing it and writing the dissertation. What happens in this game is that the analyst needs some information. He walks across the hall and talks to the man who goes out and collects it. He describes it and the man says well, I've got this system and that system and I'll try a little of each and see what I get. He comes back and says here's what I have and the analyst oh no, you missed the point a little bit over here. I want to know the color of the nodes, not how thick they are. They go back and they try it again. Otherwise, we collect information about Country X and we analyze it on Country Y. It is utterly essential. I have in my time moved within the organization, somewhat in directions other than indicated. I am making a very clear division here, but I can't just separate them and even if I did, what difference would it make. I'd call one the CIA and the other one XIA or something like that and they'd still have to be there and work together. I think it's a subterfuge to simply tell you all that you are not working for the CIA because I call it the XIA.

- Q: There is a second issue which is the compatability between operations by intelligence agencies and analysis. It seems to me very different that I would ask Admiral Turner to put a contemporary version on that--whether he does not think it would be an incompatibility. Let's say the President of the United States was to simultaneously order him: one, to produce the best possible analysis of the Cuban role in Africa and two, conduct a worldwide propaganda campaign using CIA assets to exaggerate and to alarm people about the Cuban role in Africa; and whether an academic should not wonder about whether he should cooperate with CIA on the first question if they are simultaneously engaged in the second activity.
- A: Let me make sure we are understanding our terms here because that's a very good question. He called covert action the influencing of events in a foreign country. It is not really an intelligence function. Clandestine collection is collecting information secretly overseas about foreign activities. The third function we do is research. They're all lumped together because the country decided some years ago that when it was going to do covert action--attempt to influence events overseas, which is simply one step further in the diplomatic process but not going as far as sending in the marines--it decided that the Central Intelligence Agency would be the one to do that. There have been many studious proposals to separate all covert action activities out of the Central Intelligence Agency and put them elsewhere. When I first arrived I thought that might have some real merit and I looked at it quite carefully. It has some inferences that you want to be careful about. So we do a covert action overseas, like the propaganda situation Morton described, and we concentrate on getting the truth out to other people. We're not out to do a dirty tricks game, we're trying to penetrate and get people to understand what's happening in the world when their media or society is closed. Now, the same people who will do that for us are marvelous sources of intelligence. What would we do if we separate the two. We would construct two bureaucracies--many of them working with the same individuals overseas. It would number one be confusing and difficult, but think of the effect of having a second bureaucracy just for covert action. Ladies and gentlemen you know as well as I that bureaucracies tends to perpetuate themselves and tend to grow. Today if you're in covert action in the CIA, tomorrow it may be an entirely separate section. You don't have to push covert action in order to be sure you have a job tomorrow or that you'll be active and fully employed.

If you have an agency just to do covert action, I'm afraid it will be forced upon us and that it will be generated by that agency, whereas today that is not the case whatsoever. We in the Central Intelligence Agency look on this as a subsidiary function and we only respond to requests for assistance in the covert action field.

Q: Admiral Turner, could you possibly answer one of Morton Halperin's questions about the Church Committee Report and the possible declassification of the censored parts?

A: I'd be happy to. I have not seen nor have access to the portions of the Church Committee Report that were not published. That's a matter of the United States Senate and its committees. I can only assure you that the senators who reviewed what the CIA recommended be published was not published, are by no means tools of the CIA, they made up their minds what was in the national interest to publish, and what was not in the national interest to publish. And if anybody is going to reverse their decision it will be the senators, not the CIA.

Q: My name is Norman Birnbaum, and I was just embraced by Admiral Turner. I would, with respect, distance myself a little bit. As some of you may know, I'm in litigation with the CIA in a mail opening case. This happened under the administration when directorship of the CIA was not an Amherst but a Williams graduate, Richard Helms. The point is this: The nearness to the CIA, on which Admiral Turner spoke on my part, is represented by a consulting appointment to the National Security Council of the Executive Office of the President. It's quite true that in this function as consultant presumably the reports I do could be read by the CIA, they could also xerox my articles and send them around. But the fact is that this relationship is an open relationship which my students and colleagues know about and I must say that I am pleased to be helping the administration in foreign policy--it needs help. I must say that if I had been asked to be a consultant to the CIA, I would refuse. And I would refuse not out of any disinclination to do a public service but because of--and I'm candid at this point--the CIA's record in covert operations and manipulations. It's really very, very difficult if not impossible for anybody interested in contemporary politics or social affairs to approach another colleague and say, look I'm working for the CIA but I'm only asking for local information. It makes it very, very difficult and this is the reason I think that the question raised by the Church Committee and also by Mort Halperin about the separation of covert operations from intelligence, is a question which is in the national interest and would it seems to me be of interest to all of us.

A: Let me start by reaffirming my written apology on behalf of my predecessor to Professor Birnbaum for his mail having been opened. There isn't one of us in the Agency today who doesn't believe that was a reprehensible mistake and we're very apologetic. At the same time, the professor's remark in attempting to distance himself from the CIA while he is working on the NSC, of which the CIA is a component part, strikes me as surprising. Although his relationship with the NSC is open, let me assure you he cannot work there without having access to secret information which he will not share with any of the rest of you or we will have to terminate his employment.

Q: Admiral Turner, I'm addressing a concern to you in your capacity not simply as the Director of the CIA but as head of the Intelligence Community, a position you alluded to yourself. You spoke of research and research is very dear to our hearts. So is science and I think it has to be made clear that research is even steeper with science, but not quite the same thing. I'll try to make clear what I mean in a moment. That difference was very pointedly illustrated in several recent occurrences which involved attempts to preempt publication of the results of scientific research. One case I know of was supported by the National Science Foundation. Now the essence of science is not simply research, it is the availability of results to the scientific community and it seems to me that attempts to suppress this result, particularly when the Intelligence Community is not involved at all in financing or funding of these things, is to put it mildly insidious to the health of the scientific community and the academic community. And I don't understand how it could possibly be justified by anyone in the Intelligence Community.

A: To begin with, I looked into this and I know of no authorized intelligence community effort to suppress those pieces of information. It was apparently somebody from the Intelligence Community acting as a member of the association or something who did try to discourage that. At the same time, I hope you are not stating that the man who worked so diligently during the 1940s under Stack Stadium at the University of Chicago should not have been allowed to keep their scientific research secretive. We're only allowed to have secrecy in times during war, is that correct? The distinction between peace and war is not that clear cut. And you certainly don't wait until the day the war starts to start building tanks. Our objective today is to ensure that we don't get into war and we have to have both scientific development and good intelligence information in order to achieve that objective which is what drives all of us in government and international relations.

Q: I have been personally aware of Stan Turner's career for a good many years and I was pleased with his appointment and wish to assure him I would have voted for the President had I known his intention to assign Stan to his present duty. (inaudible)...Do you feel that we do in fact have a balance of national intelligence effort to make proper use of that.

A: Thank you Dave. I do. As far as the reduction of clandestine intelligence operators is concerned, I would like to make it very clear that we did not reduce our clandestine people overseas where they are working on the important things. What we did was cut the overhead at headquarters. We were overstaffed and people were underemployed, and I don't see how I can challenge promising young people to make the future intelligence community unless we really challenge them and they were being so challenged because of the excess number of people. The second part of your question was are we working with the academic community, and the answer is no to that. That is what I am striving to improve and I think it is most important to both of us. About once every six weeks I get out on a college campus and speak and talk with students, both in small groups and also big public audiences. I'm trying to open up these channels of communication again because I think there is so much benefit to both sides.

Q: Admiral Turner, for the sake of this question let's grant that proposition that it is essential from your perspective that the Intelligence Community and academia work together. It is a two part question: What is the professional identity status of the person who is recruited by the CIA as to the CIA's corps of professional and moral integrity? How is this relationship resolved where the contract with the person's university has a disclosure stipulation in other types of employment?

A: That is a very interesting and good question. We believe with great sincerity that we are as moral and have as much integrity at the Central Intelligence Agency and Intelligence Community in general as any profession. The moral conflicts that are generated in intelligence work are neither quantitatively nor qualitatively different than the moral conflicts that are faced by most other professions and lines of work in our country. I come to this job as a former military officer. Look at the moral conflicts a military man faces when he asks the question--will he shoot to kill. There is no greater moral conflict that a man must face in life. Look at the moral conflicts that have been exposed in recent years about the American business community. Will you lose that contract or will you offer a bribe to that foreign company, or country with whom you are dealing. So

too, we in the intelligence have moral conflicts. But they are not different. They are tough and we work hard to get our people to understand basic ground rules under which they work, the standards which the President of the United States will accept, that I will accept, and it is not easy and it puts a tremendous load on the young people who come in and accept the sacrifices of being in the intelligence business. I assure you there are real sacrifices, but we do have a great sense of integrity and moral standards. I intend to insure that those are rigorously enunciated to all, the people who join our organization. And I would like you to know that at this moment I am very engrossed in a project with the leading academics and the leading universities in writing a specific code of ethics for the intelligence community. I found when I took this job that this man had written an article in a leading journal he said there was a code of ethics needed in the intelligence community. I called him up and asked him if he would work. That was a year and a quarter ago, we are still working on it. You can laugh, but it is not easy to do. It is not easy to write something that will be specific enough to give guidance and not so specific as to tie people's hands. Yet, I owe it to my people to give them moral and ethical guidance, because the man in the field has got to take that responsibility on his shoulders. They're young men and women out there who are doing it for you. They are brave, they are capable and they are moral. I am trying hard to give them explicit guidance to help them on their course. I thank you for the privilege of being with you today. I look forward to more interchange between all of us in the intelligence community of our country and all of you in the academic professions we all hold in such high esteem.